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Adaptive management is the new paradigm in environmental law.  
It is omnipresent in scholarship and management documents and is even 
starting to appear in court opinions.  There have been many calls for 
environmental law to adapt itself to adaptive management by becoming 
more flexible and dynamic.  But does adaptive management really 
warrant a revolution in environmental law?  Or is it adaptive 
management that might need to adapt to the world of environmental 
law? 
There has been an abundance of scholarship on the strengths of 
adaptive management, making the case for changing environmental law 
to embrace adaptive management.  But answering the two questions 
above also requires a close examination of the limits of adaptive 
management and whether it is important enough for environmental law 
that wholesale changes in the legal structure are required.1  In this 
 
∗ Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.  Thanks to Kai Lee, Robin 
Kundis Craig, J.B. Ruhl, Holly Doremus, Steve Gold, and participants at the Akron School of Law 
Symposium on the Future of Environmental Law for thoughtful comments.  This work was 
generously supported by a grant from the David and Lucille Packard Foundation. 
 1.  I agree with Holly Doremus that these questions have not been asked enough in the legal, 
scientific, or management literature.  See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information 
Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1460 (2011) [hereinafter Doremus, Adaptive Management as an 
Information Problem] (noting that there is “not enough discussion about whether [adaptive 
management] ought to be used”). 
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Article, I summarize the literature noting those limits, and my 
conclusion is that those limits are significant enough that we should be 
wary of wholesale revisions of environmental law to allow adaptive 
management to occur.  Adaptive management has an important role to 
play, but there are many questions that it cannot answer.  Moreover, the 
increased flexibility and dynamism that have been called for in 
environmental law would carry their own costs. 
I. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AS THE NEW PARADIGM OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Adaptive management is based on the principle of “learning by 
doing”2 and is frequently presented as a form of experimentation.  
Ideally, managers implement different management policies for a 
resource at different places at the same time, they monitor any 
differences in outcomes over time, and those differences in outcomes 
help answer questions about which management policies might be more 
or less successful for achieving management goals.  For instance, a 
forest manager might be uncertain about whether harvesting standing 
dead timber after a fire increases or reduces forest regeneration.  The 
manager might harvest timber at five sites that have had a fire, not 
harvest timber at another five sites, and then monitor whether there are 
any differences in regeneration at the ten sites.3 
The concept of adaptive management has been expanded beyond 
this classic form (which came to be known as “active adaptive 
management”).4  One extension is that managers, instead of consciously 
or actively creating differences in management across multiple sites in 
order to produce information, might rely on historical data to produce 
rigorous models about how environmental systems function, use those 
models to identify a single best-practice for management, and implement 
that practice.  Managers would also use monitoring to observe whether 
results diverge from predictions from the model, and use those 
divergences to update the model and the management system.  This 
option gained the moniker of “passive adaptive management” because 
managers were not using active experimentation to reduce uncertainty.5  
 
 2.  C.J. Walters & C.S. Holling, Large-scale Management Experiments and Learning By 
Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060 (1990). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 2061.  A key problem of “passive adaptive management” is that it can “confound 
management and environmental effects.”  Because there is only one management model, it is 
impossible to determine whether a change in outcome is the result of a change in management or 
2
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Another option is to simply make initial management choices in a 
“haphazard” way without development of a rigorous model to generate 
predictions about what results management should produce; instead, 
managers would simply monitor results and adjust if results were not 
achieving management goals.  This is appropriately called “trial and 
error,”6 and many adaptive management scholars consider it, in fact, to 
be very different from adaptive management.7 
Adaptive management has become a dominant theme in the 
scholarship and practice of environmental law, so dominant that many 
scholars and managers assert that the only feasible option for 
environmental law is adaptive management.8  The dynamic nature of 
natural systems has provided a major rationale for the widespread 
embrace of adaptive management.9  The looming inevitability of 
significant climate change provides another impetus for these calls for 
adaptive management, as scholars assert that the only way for 
environmental regulation and management to remain functional in the 
face of climate change is for those regulatory and management systems 
to become adaptive.10 
 
concurrent changes in environmental conditions (e.g., climate or weather). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See, e.g., Kai Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, 3 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y NO. 2, ART. 3 
(1999); Lance Gunderson & Stephen S. Light, Adaptive Management and Adaptive Governance in 
the Everglades Ecosystem, 39 POLICY SCI.’S 323, 326-27 (2006). 
 8.  J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
424, 424-25 (2010) (“Adaptive management has become the tonic of natural resources policy.”); id. 
at 430 (“[T]here has been broad consensus among resource managers and academics that adaptive 
management is the only practical way to implement ecosystem management.”); J.B. Ruhl, Climate 
Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 
422 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 21, 25 n.7 (2005) (“As gloomy as the prospects for adaptive management appear today, 
regulation by adaptive management is inevitable.”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem 
Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
943, 943 (2003). 
 9.  See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial 
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1121, 1139 (1994) (“The major 
institutional change necessitated by the nonequilibrium paradigm is the need to apply adaptive 
management to biodiversity protection.”); J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO 
L. REV. 385, 394-95, 402-03 (2002); Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a 
Nonequilibrium View of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871 (2006). 
 10.  See, e.g., Alejandro Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 39-40 (2009); Joshua J. Lawler, 
Climate Change Adaptation Strategies for Resource Management and Conservation Planning, 1162 
ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI.’S 79, 85 (2009); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to 
Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land 
Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 836-37 (2009); Robin Kundis Craig, Stationarity is Dead—
Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. 
3
Biber: Adaptive Management
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 4 BIBER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  2:31 PM 
936 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:933 
Yet the calls for the widespread adoption of adaptive management 
have been matched by the observations that adaptive management has 
had few real-world successes to date.11  A common response to this 
tension has been to argue that inflexible bureaucracies and laws are a 
primary obstacle to successful implementation of adaptive 
management,12 and the legal system must give way and change to allow 
for adaptation to proceed.13 
 
L. REV. 9, 17 (2010). 
 11.   See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the 
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 54 (2001) 
[herein after Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act] (noting that “skepticism 
about adaptive management comes from the lack of success stories to date”); Carl J. Walters, Is 
Adaptive Management Helping to Solve Fisheries Problems?, 36 AMBIO 304 (2007) (arguing that 
adaptive management has “been radically less successful than one would expect from its intuitive 
appeal”). 
 12.  See Brian Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability in Social-
ecological Systems, 9(2) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 5 (2004) (“Adaptive management, widely and 
deservedly promoted as a necessary basis for sustainable development, has frequently failed because 
the existing governance structures have not allowed it to function effectively.”); C.S. Holling, What 
Barriers? What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWABLE OF ECOSYSTEMS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 3, 9 (Lance H. Gunderson et al., eds. 1995) (arguing that agencies tend to focus on 
one target and short-term outputs and fail to test hypotheses or experiment and that the solution is 
“flexible, adaptive policies, not rigid, locked-in ones”); Ahjond S. Garemstani et al., Panarchy, 
Adaptive Management, and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience, 87 NEB.  L. REV. 
1036, 1036 (2009) (arguing that solving environmental problems “requires frequent recalibration of 
the policy used to address the environmental issue”); Craig R. Allen et al., Adaptive Management 
For A Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1339, 1343 (2011) (“Legal certainty does not mesh 
well with environmental unpredictability. . . .  The certainty of law and institutional rigidity often 
limit the experimentation that is necessary for adaptive management,” and the “adversarial character 
of administrative law, combined with the need for certainty (e.g., procedural rules) in the larger 
realm of American law, is likely incompatible with adaptive management”).  Surveys of federal 
environmental agency employees have revealed similar sentiments.  Tomas M. Koontz & Jennifer 
Bodine, Implementing Ecosystem Management in Public Agencies: Lessons from the U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management and the Forest Service, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 60, 65 (2008) (BLM 
employees report lawsuits and appeals as most important legal barrier to adaptive management); 
George H. Stankey et al., Adaptive Management and the Northwest Forest Plan: Rhetoric and 
Reality, 101 J. OF FORESTRY 40 (Jan/Feb. 2003) (interview with primarily Forest Service employees 
finds that they believe that law is a significant constraint on adaptive management and that 
endangered species protection reduces risk taking); FORREST FLEISCHMAN, BUREAUCRACY, 
COLLABORATION, AND COPRODUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE USDA FOREST SERVICE 12 (2008), available at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/publications/materials/conference_papers/fleischman.pdf 
(noting survey that found that FS employees complained of constraints by legal system and risk-
aversion within the agency that restricted adaptive management). 
 13.  Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 65-67 (“Legislatures and policymakers should thus 
incorporate comprehensive and pervasive adaptive management requirements and procedures into 
natural resource management statutes.”); Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience May 
Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the 
Everglades, 87 NEB. L. REV. 893, 949 (2009) (“Legal vehicles should enhance flexibility, learning, 
and adaptive approaches, rather than reinforce pathologically resilient institutions and 
4
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In terms of the current legal structure, scholars and managers have 
articulated two major ways that law might deter adaptive management.  
First, the legal system imposes significant costs on active management 
efforts through front-end analytic and public participation requirements 
under statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”);14 the costs of doing 
environmental review analysis and allowing for public participation, and 
the associated costs and risks of judicial review, deter agencies from 
making decisions.15  This undermines adaptive management, which 
 
ecosystems.”); Craig R. Allen et al., supra note 12, at 1343 (“[E]nvironmental law must be 
‘adapted’ to fit with adaptive management.”). But see Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, 
supra note 8, at 54-56 (arguing that implementation of adaptive management requires restrictions on 
volatility and drift in agency decision-making). 
A related claim is that adaptive management requires agencies to embrace “organizational 
instability.”  K. Jeffrey Danter et al., Organizational Change as a Component of Ecosystem 
Management, 13 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 537, 538 (2000); Steven L. Yaffee, Ecosystem Management in 
Practice: The Importance of Human Institutions, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 724, 726 (1996); 
Stephen S. Light et al., The Everglades: Evolution of Management in a Turbulent Ecosystem, in 
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWABLE OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 103, 158 (Lance 
H. Gunderson et al., eds. 1995); George H. Stankey et al., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
50-51 (2005).  The two concepts (legal flexibility and organizational instability) are often connected 
in the adaptive management literature, but they can be distinguished.  One could imagine a creative, 
dynamic agency that nonetheless operates within a legal framework that is fairly stringent.  In this 
paper, I only focus on the questions related to legal flexibility. 
 14.  Mark J. Wieringa & Anthony G. Morton, Hydropower, Adaptive Management, and 
Biodiversity, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 831, 839 (1996); Thrower, supra note 9, at 886-87; Ruhl, 
Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 8, at 36; Craig R. Allen et al., supra note 12; 
Melinda Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas Development: Existing 
Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 39 E.L.R. 10962, 10972-73 (2009). 
 15.  Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back 
Again, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 74-75 (2005) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Panarchy] (“[T]he 
adversarial and litigious character of contemporary administrative law coupled with its overall 
tendency toward nitpicking enforcement of fixed “command-and-control” rules—especially 
procedural rules, which are singularly easy for courts to enforce—and its reluctance to countenance 
uncertainty and lack of information as the basis for agency decision-making are all profoundly at 
odds with the very concept of adaptive management.”); Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 66; Mary 
Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience, 87 
NEB. L. REV. 950, 1001-02 (2009) (“Another challenge of adaptive management is that it may be 
difficult to incorporate substantial public participation. . . .  If we need to wait to convene all 
stakeholders and achieve consensus or near consensus before every action, we simply will not be 
able to have the quick reaction time necessary for adaptive management.”); Ruhl, Regulation by 
Adaptive Management, supra note 8, at 31 (“Quite simply, there is good reason to doubt whether 
regulation by adaptive management is possible without substantial change in administrative law.”).  
Some of these scholars also note, however, that despite the obstacles that NEPA and the APA might 
impose on adaptive management, agencies can nonetheless successfully pursue adaptive 
management in the right circumstances.  See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 8, at 441 (“[T]he 
impression in agencies that lawsuits and appeals present a barrier to implementing adaptive 
management is unfounded.”); id. at 475 (“Despite fundamentally different assumptions about 
5
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requires the repeated reconsideration and reevaluation of decisions over 
time in response to new information and, in the context of active 
adaptive management, the ability to make more complicated decisions 
when setting up an experimental system in the first place. 
Second, substantive restrictions on the kinds of managerial actions 
that management and regulatory agencies can take might foreclose a 
range of important adaptive management options from implementation.  
For example, the Endangered Species Act’s (“ESA”) prohibition on 
agency action that will jeopardize the existence of listed species might 
prevent adaptive management experiments that carry risks for listed 
species, but that might also produce significant improvements in 
knowledge about how to protect those listed species or other natural 
resources.16 
Particular ideas to respond to these problems include: placing 
adaptive management authority or mandates directly into environmental 
statutes or regulations;17 reducing or changing judicial review of agency 
decisions (whether in general, or in the specific context of adaptive 
management);18 eliminating the finality of at least some kinds of agency 
decisions and requiring regular or even constant reevaluation of those 
decisions;19 reducing or altering NEPA requirements for agency 
 
knowledge and decision-making, adaptive management is compatible with NEPA.”) 
 16.  Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 13, at 946-47; Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 29; 
Angelo, supra note 15, at 1001; JAMES PIPKIN, THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN REVISITED 49-50 
(1998) (arguing that adaptive management in the Northwest Forest Plan was stifled by ESA 
constraints); Lance Gunderson, Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive Management—Antidotes for 
Spurious Certitude?, 3 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y NO. 1, ART. 7 (1999) (arguing that adaptive management 
in Everglades was obstructed by concerns about whether experiments might harm a listed species); 
Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A Legal and 
Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 496-501 (1996) (arguing that Clean Water 
Act and ESA restrictions threatened experimental methods of managing water to restore the 
Everglades). 
 17.  J.B. Ruhl, Adaptive Management for Natural Resources—Inevitable, Impossible or 
Both?, 54 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. FOUND. PROCEEDINGS 11, 11-33 (2008) (“Ideally, 
however, Congress and state legislatures will fund and empower agencies to implement adaptive 
management.”); Thrower, supra note 9, at 894-95 (calling for incorporation of adaptive 
management principles into NEPA through regulations); Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 65-67. 
 18.  Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, supra note 9, at 406-407 (calling for greater 
discretion and more deferential and reduced judicial review for agencies involved in adaptive 
management); Karkkainen, Panarchy, supra note 15, at 75 (proposing a “two-track” system in 
which adaptive management projects would receive different treatment under administrative law); 
Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 66-67. 
 19.  Tarlock, supra note 9, at 1140-44; Thrower, supra note 9, at 885-87; Ruhl & Fischman, 
supra note 8, at, 437-38 (critique of one-shot, predictive, “front-end” model of administrative law as 
inconsistent with iterative, repeated model of adaptive management and realities of natural 
resources management, especially climate change); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management 
Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KANSAS L. REV. 1249, 1251-52 
6
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decisionmaking;20 reducing or altering public participation requirements 
for agency decision-making;21 reducing or altering other procedural 
requirements for agency activities such as plan development or 
management decision-making;22 and altering substantive restrictions that 
statutes such as the ESA might place on adaptive management.23 
These are not just ideas being batted around by scholars.  
Management and regulatory agencies have adopted the rhetoric of 
adaptive management.  The U.S. Forest Service repeatedly relied upon 
the concept of adaptive management to justify proposed revisions of its 
planning regulations that would eliminate mandates to maintain 
minimum viable populations of certain wildlife species and would 
reduce judicial review, environmental analysis, and public participation 
for the development of plans for National Forest lands.24 
II. THE LIMITS OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
Should we be altering the structure and substance of environmental 
law to advance the concept of adaptive management?  Is adaptive 
management in fact so important that environmental law should be 
 
(2004); Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 66-67. 
 20.  Melinda Harm Benson & Ahjond S. Garmestani, Embracing Panarchy, Building 
Resilience, and Integrating Adaptive Management Through a Rebirth of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 92 J. OF ENVTL. MGMT. 1420 (2011). 
 21.  Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, supra note 9, at 405-06 (“Adaptive 
management cannot work if citizens can challenge every recalibration decision with this full range 
of public participation tools.  There must be some insulation of the adaptive management process 
from the debilitating participation of every interest group demanding a “seat at the table” and right 
to challenge each and every move the agency makes.”); Angelo, supra note 15, at 1002-03; 
Karkkainen, Panarchy, supra note 15, at 74-75.  
 22.  Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 65-67 (“For example, public lands managers may need 
some form of general planning requirements coupled with abbreviated administrative procedures for 
specific implementation decisions, periodic rather than continual judicial review for rationality, the 
ability to rely on postdecisional evaluations rather than predecisional justifications, or increased 
emergency authorities in order to achieve true capacity for adaptive management in the face of 
climate change impacts to resources and ecosystems.”); cf. Glicksman, supra note 10, at 836-37 
(arguing that cumbersome planning process gets in the way of adaptation to climate change 
pressures); 
 23.  Angelo, supra note 15, at 1002 (arguing for lower ESA standards when “the primary 
purpose of the proposed action is to maintain or restore ecological resilience to an ecosystem”); 
ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLING SENSE OF 
IMMENSITY 168, 269 (2007) (call for exemptions from environmental laws (like ESA) to allow for 
more experiments); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE 
PACIFIC NORTHWEST 342-43 (1996). 
 24.   See 73 Fed. Reg. 21,468 (Apr. 21, 2008); 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005); see also 
Martin Nie, Whatever Happened to Ecosystem Management and Federal Lands Planning, in THE 
LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT LAW AND 
POLICY (Kalyani Robbins, ed. 2013). 
7
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overhauled in response? 
There are reasons to question whether adaptive management will be 
so central to the future of environmental law.  There are limits to the 
ability of adaptive management to reduce uncertainty (the primary 
argument for adaptive management), costs to the use of adaptive 
management, and limits to the ability of adaptive management to 
improve management and regulatory outcomes. 
A. Limits to the Ability of Adaptive Management to Reduce 
Uncertainty 
1. Problems of Scale 
Active adaptive management implies the use of at least one control 
and one treatment option for management, and ideally many more for 
statistical analysis purposes.  But for environmental problems that are 
large-scale getting even two replicates may be extremely costly, or even 
impossible.25  At the extreme, we cannot develop two replicate Earths to 
conduct an adaptive management experiment for possible efforts to use 
geoengineering to offset the impacts of greenhouse gases.26  For a 
system like the Florida Everglades, which has been the focus of 
ecological restoration efforts for decades, replication also may not be 
feasible.  The Everglades function as one large, interconnected 
ecological system; one purpose of the Everglades restoration program is 
to reconnect the hydrology of the system as a whole so that it functions 
better.  It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to envision how we 
might undertake replicates of the major management choices we need to 
pursue for the entire Everglades system. 
Of course, not all adaptive management need be active.  Passive 
adaptive management might be feasible at large scales because it does 
not require replication.  However, note that, as a result, we may reduce 
 
 25.  R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for Applications to 
Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2423 (2006) (active adaptive 
management not useful for “large-scale and long-term” problems because can’t develop 
experimental system at that level). 
 26.  Geoengineering involves the active human manipulation of the global climate or 
atmosphere to offset the effects of greenhouse gases on the climate, either through the reduction of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, or through reduction of the gasses’ effects on 
global temperatures.  One of the most commonly suggested options is the injection of sulfur 
aerosols into the upper atmosphere; the aerosols would increase the reflection of solar radiation and 
therefore reduce the heating of the Earth from the sun.  In principle, this could offset the increased 
insulation caused by greenhouse gases.  However, there are tremendous uncertainties about possible 
side effects from such efforts. 
8
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the ability to learn from our management and regulatory choices—
precisely the point of adaptive management in the first place. 
Likewise, we might develop ways to conduct adaptive management 
at subsets of larger units.27  This concept, to some extent, is how the 
adaptive management program in the Everglades has tried to address the 
problem of doing replication for large-scale management of an overall 
system.  Managers have developed smaller-scale pilot projects that 
identify key uncertainties in how the larger system operates and attempt 
to reduce that uncertainty through experimentation.28  For instance, there 
is uncertainty about how successful different methods to backfill 
drainage canals and restore natural water flow to the northern Everglades 
might be and what risks each method might entail.  The agency has 
implemented a pilot project of different backfilling efforts for a limited 
number of canals to reduce that uncertainty.29  This can help reduce 
uncertainty, but it is limited by the need to extrapolate from the smaller-
scale experiments to the larger-scale system that is of management 
interest. 
2. Problems of Time 
Adaptive management necessarily requires time: time for the 
adaptive management program to be designed; time for replicates to be 
established; and time for management to occur, monitoring to be 
conducted, results to be collected, and data to be analyzed.30  However, 
some environmental problems are pressing enough that we might not be 
able to wait for the production of information from the adaptive 
management process to reduce uncertainty.  A final decision must be 
made now.31 
 
 27.  Gregory et al., supra note 25; Murdoch K. McAllister & Randall M. Peterman, 
Experimental Design in the Management of Fisheries: A Review, 12 N. AM. J. OF FISH. MGMT. 1 
(1992); Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1487-88. 
 28.  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING THE 
EVERGLADES: THE FIRST BIENNIAL REVIEW–2006, 6-12 (providing overview of these efforts and 
call for increasing their use). 
 29.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING THE EVERGLADES: THE 
FOURTH BIENNIAL REVIEW 70-71 (2012). 
 30.  See W.H. Moir & W.M. Block, Adaptive Management on Public Lands in the United 
States: Commitment or Rhetoric?, 28 ENVTL. MGMT. 141, 144 (2001); Byron K. Williams et al., 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
TECHNICAL GUIDE 10 (2009 ed.) [hereinafter Williams et al., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
TECHNICAL GUIDE]. 
 31.  See, e.g., Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 
1471 (noting that a key question is whether learning will happen quickly enough under adaptive 
management to make a difference for management). 
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This is certainly not a fatal problem for many adaptive management 
efforts.32  One advantage of adaptive management is that it allows for 
information production to be produced concurrently with management 
choices, since it is management that produces the relevant information.  
But when a diversity of management choices cannot be taken, when 
decisions are irreversible, and when they must be made now, then 
neither active nor passive adaptive management is feasible.  A 
paradigmatic example of this is the decision about whether to take a 
small population of an endangered species into captivity for breeding (as 
with the California condor in the 1980s).33  The population is small 
enough that replication is not feasible (foreclosing active adaptive 
management), the decision about which approach to use may well be 
irreversible (foreclosing passive adaptive management), and delay might 
simply allow the species to vanish into extinction. 
3. Problems of Information Production 
Active and passive adaptive management both require high-quality 
monitoring to be successful.  However, there are several reasons to 
question whether regulatory and management agencies will, in fact, 
undertake the high-quality monitoring needed to reduce uncertainty. 
High-quality monitoring requires extended periods of time and 
often must be continuous in that time frame, it must be well-matched in 
time and space to the scale of the questions it seeks to answer, and it is 
usually extremely costly.34  It is often difficult for outsiders, particularly 
non-experts, to assess the quality of monitoring.35 
The need for continuity, and the opacity of monitoring to outside 
supervision, make monitoring particularly susceptible to asymmetric 
 
 32.  Political pressures to make management decisions happen sooner rather than later might 
likewise prevent effective use of adaptive management.  As BLM developed oil and gas in 
Wyoming’s Powder River Basin, the agency claimed that it did not have the authority to slow down 
development to allow for the results of monitoring to be collected, analyzed, and used to adapt 
management decisions; accordingly, an adaptive management option was rejected by the agency.  
See Melinda Harm Benson, Adaptive Management Approaches by Resource Management Agencies 
in the United States: Implications for Energy Development in the Interior West, 28 J. ENERGY & 
NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 107 (2010); Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas 
Development, supra note 14, at 10974-75 (noting that political pressure on BLM to quickly approve 
oil and gas leases in Pinedale, Wyoming region lead to massive expansion of drilling before any 
monitoring data could be brought to bear on the decision-making process). 
 33.  For an overview of the relevant facts, see National Audubon Society v. Hester, 801 F.2d 
405 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 34.  Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22-34 
(2011). 
 35.  Id. at 27-34. 
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pressures in the political process.36  Myopia makes it difficult for 
agencies and legislatures to commit to long-term monitoring 
programs. 37  Courts often defer to the information produced by 
agencies, further weakening incentives to produce high-quality 
information.38  Agencies with multiple objectives might be wary of 
pursuing monitoring when the resulting data might result in conflicts 
with other objectives. 39  Even when a direct conflict does not exist, 
actual monitoring data might constrain an agency’s freedom of 
maneuver and autonomy in the future in unpredictable ways.40  Finally, 
agency institutional culture might not be amenable to pursuing 
monitoring.  For instance, scientists in agencies might have few 
professional incentives to conduct long-term monitoring projects. 41 
4. Problems of Institutional Continuity 
Institutional continuity is not just important for the collection of 
data, but also for the overall maintenance of adaptive management 
programs.  Often the results of different experiments may take many 
years to bear the fruit of reduced uncertainty, in part because of the long 
time frames at which many ecological processes operate, or alternatively 
the long time frames required to detect the signal of meaningful 
information in the noise of ecological variation.  Thus, tremendous 
patience may be needed by agencies, legislators, interest groups, and the 
public to determine whether different management options will produce 
different results.  Many adaptive management advocates frame adaptive 
management as a long-term investment in improved information, often 
at the short-term cost of foregone resource exploitation or increased risk 
to environmental benefits.42 
 
 36.  Id. at 35-39.  I discuss these asymmetries infra Part II.B.2. 
 37.  Id. at 39-40. 
 38.  Id. at 41-43. 
 39.  Id. at 43-48. 
 40.  Id. at 48-51. 
 41.  Id. at 51-53. 
 42.  See, e.g., Tracy M. Rout et al., Optimal Adaptive Management For The Translocation of 
a Threatened Species, 19 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 515, 520 (2009); Carl Walters, Challenges in 
adaptive Management of Riparian and Coastal Ecosystems, 1 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y ART. 1 (1997); 
Andrew N. Gray, Adaptive Ecosystem Management in the Pacific Northwest: A Case Study from 
Coastal Oregon, CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (Nov. 23, 2000), available at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol4/iss2/art6/; Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Dancing: 
Interactions Between Social Resilience and Ecological Crises, in NAVIGATING SOCIAL-
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE 33, 44 (Fikret Berkes 
& Johan Colding, eds. 2003) (“Learning is a long-term proposition, which requires a ballast against 
short-term politics and objectives.”); see also Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information 
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However, if myopia is a significant factor in environmental 
decision-making, this patience might be hard to come by.  Building 
strong institutions that are resilient to political pressures would seem to 
be a plausible response, but many adaptive management advocates also 
call for organizational instability as necessary for adaptive management 
to succeed.43 
5. Problems of Learning 
If the dynamism of an environmental resource is high enough, there 
are questions about whether learning and therefore the reduction of 
uncertainty is even feasible.  In a number of areas, environmental 
conditions change quickly enough, and are unpredictable enough, that 
data are useless for management or regulatory purposes soon after they 
are collected.  For instance, water quality in beaches can change in a 
matter of minutes, far more quickly than the twenty-four to forty-eight-
hour timeframes required for current monitoring techniques, and water 
quality can change for reasons that are still only partially understood.44  
The population dynamics of certain fish species (such as sardines, 
anchovies, and perhaps cod) are highly variable and still poorly 
 
Problem, supra note 1, at 1461 (Adaptive management “requires striking a balance between short-
term management objectives and long-term learning, between devoting resources to management 
and to monitoring.”). 
 43.  See supra note 13 at accompanying text. 
 44.  See Molly K. Leecaster & Stephen B. Weisberg, Effect of Sampling Frequency on 
Shoreline Microbiology Assessments, 42 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 1150 (2001); Kellogg J. 
Schwab, Are Existing Bacterial Indicators Adequate for Determining Recreational Water Illness in 
Waters Impacted by Nonpoint Pollution?, 18 EPIDEMIOLOGY 21 (2007); Timothy J. Wade et al., 
Rapidly Measured Indicators of Recreational Water Quality Are Predictive of Swimming-
Associated Gastrointestinal Illness, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 24 (2006); Linwood 
Pendleton, The Economics of Using Ocean Observing Systems to Improve Beach Closure Policy, 36 
COASTAL MGMT. 165, 167-68 (2008); A.B. Boehm et al., Decadal and Shorter Period Variability of 
Surf Zone Water Quality at Huntington Beach, California, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3885 (2002) 
(“The concentration of fecal indicator bacteria in the surf zone at Huntington Beach, CA, varies 
over time scales that span at least 7 orders of magnitude, from minutes to decades. . . .  These results 
demonstrate that coastal water quality is forced by a complex combination of local and external 
processes and raise questions about the efficacy of existing marine bathing water monitoring and 
reporting programs.”); Joon Ha Kim & Stanley B. Grant, Public Mis-Notification of Coastal Water 
Quality: A Probabilistic Evaluation of Posting Errors at Huntington Beach, California, 38 ENVTL. 
SCI. & TECH. 2497, 2501 (2004) (time delays in analysis, high variability of contamination, and 
infrequent sampling mean that posting water-contamination notices are prone to large amounts of 
error (both under- and overprotective) with up to forty-percent error rate) (“An analysis of . . . data 
at Huntington Beach reveals that posting decisions would have to be updated every forty minutes 
(or more frequently) to significantly reduce posting errors.”); Alexandria D. Boehm & Stephen B. 
Weisberg, Tidal Forcing of Enterococci at Marine Recreational Beaches at Fortnightly and 
Semidiurnal Frequencies, 39 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5575, 5578 (2005). 
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understood, such that it might not be possible to predict whether a 
population is about to collapse ahead of time.45  Dynamism and 
complexity can be manageable and be the basis for useful learning if 
they fall within certain limits, but not if dynamism and complexity result 
in unpredictable changes that produce either new, unprecedented states 
for natural systems, or otherwise result in uncertain limits to the status of 
important environmental resources. 
The challenge is that if past performance is no indication at all of 
the future, then there is little possibility that the results of past adaptive 
management will be of use for future management choices.  Advocates 
of adaptive management have pointed to the dynamism and complexity 
of natural systems as a reason to embrace the concept, but if dynamism 
and complexity are high and unpredictable enough, it is hard to see how 
any form of experimentation or monitoring could reduce uncertainty to a 
degree sufficient to help guide decisions. 
B. The Costs of Adaptive Management 
1. Direct Costs of Adaptive Management 
Adaptive management is costly in terms of resources and foregone 
opportunities.46  Active and passive adaptive management both impose 
 
 45.  See W.G. Clark, THE LESSONS OF THE PERUVIAN ANCHOVETA FISHERY, 19 CALIFORNIA 
COOPERATIVE OCEANIC FISHERIES INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 57, 60-61 (1975-76); Daniel Lluch-
Belda et al., The Recovery of the California Sardine as Related to Global Change, 33 CALIFORNIA 
COOPERATIVE OCEANIC FISHERIES INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 50, 50, 58 (1992); Kevin Hill & Tim 
Baumgartner, Pacific Sardine: Past, Present, and Future, Symposium Introduction, 46 CALIFORNIA 
COOPERATIVE OCEANIC FISHERIES INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 73, 73 (2005); Arthur F. McEvoy & 
Harry N. Scheiber, Scientists, Entrepreneurs, and the Policy Process: A Study of the post-1945 
California Sardine Depletion, 44 J. ECON. HISTORY 393, 398 (1984); R.J.H. Beverton, Small 
Marine Pelagic Fish and the Threat of Fishing; Are They Endangered, 37 J. FISH BIOLOGY (Supp. 
A.) 5 (1990). 
 46.  See, e.g., Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2411 (arguing that biological scientists are 
“attracted to AM because it provides a tenable mechanism for applying the scientific method to 
challenging problems facing complex ecosystems, often resulting in the design of costly 
experiments that tend to ignore impacts on other important environmental, social, or economic 
objectives”); Craig R. Allen & Lance H. Gunderson, Pathology and Failure in the Design and 
Implementation of Adaptive Management, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1379, 1381 (2011); see also 
Gretchen J.A. Hansen, The Value of Information in Fishery Management, 33 FISHERIES 340 (2008) 
(noting tradeoff between obtaining new information and getting additional production from the 
resource); HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 9 (2011) [hereinafter HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM]; Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, 
at 1459; Marcia Barinaga, A recipe for river recovery?, 273 SCI. 1648, 1650 (1996); KAI LEE, 
COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE 53, 66 (1992); Carl J. Walters & Roger Green, Valuation of 
Experimental Management Options for Ecological Systems, 61 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 987, 993 
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costs for monitoring and analyzing the results of management decisions; 
active adaptive management imposes the additional costs of establishing 
multiple management strategies (which often may be more costly than 
simply managing pursuant to a single prescription).  All of these costs 
may be significant.47 
There are also additional costs.  In active adaptive management, by 
definition, we are choosing to use a diverse strategy of management 
techniques.  Some of those techniques will likely or certainly be less 
effective at achieving particular goals than others, so the choice of a 
diverse strategy will result in less output of those goals, at least in the 
near term.48  For instance, the decision to close some areas of a fishing 
ground in order to determine whether closures will improve the status of 
a fish stock will necessarily result in less catch of fish in the near term.49 
Of course, the cost of adaptive management does not mean that it 
should not be pursued.  The key question is whether the cost is 
outweighed by the benefit of new information or reduced uncertainty 
that adaptive management can provide.50  An example of how a cost-
benefit analysis might weigh against adaptive management comes from 
efforts to control the sea lamprey, an invasive aquatic species that 
significantly harms fisheries in the Great Lakes.  There are existing, 
proven mechanisms to control the lamprey, but also additional possible 
tools that might be more effective.  Researchers concluded, however, 
that the additional knowledge from an adaptive management program 
was outweighed by the benefits of pursuing existing control methods for 
the lampreys.  Thus, the funds that would be needed to be spent on 
testing new methods and monitoring the results would be better spent on 
current management choices.51 
 
(1997). 
 47.  HOLLY DOREMUS, ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 46, at 5 
(adaptive management “requires more resources than conventional management, because doing it 
right requires taking the time to carefully analyze the system at the outset, monitor the results, and 
periodically reassess and revise”). 
 48.  Cindy L. Halbert, How Adaptive is Adaptive Management? Implementing Adaptive 
Management in Washington State and British Columbia, 1 REVIEWS IN FISHERY SCI. NO. 3, 261, 
274 (1993); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 
DUKE L.J. 913, 942-43 (2005) (noting tradeoff between “exploration” (i.e., learning) and 
“exploitation” (i.e., production or achieving the underlying goals) is inherent in flexibility, and a 
mixed strategy that is only partly flexible and adaptive may be superior). 
 49.  Donald Ludwig et al., Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and Conservation: Lessons 
from History, 260 SCI. 17, 17-18 (1993). 
 50.  Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1479. 
 51.  Eli P. Fenichel & Gretchen J.A. Hansen, The Opportunity Cost of Information: An 
Economic Framework For Understanding the Balance Between Assessment and Control in Sea 
Lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) Management, 67 CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 209, 210 
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Cost will not simply be economic.  Experimentation in management 
of endangered species can provide important information and reduced 
uncertainty, but it can also create risks of harm to the species, even the 
possibility of extinction.  Consider a proposal to allow logging in 
selected riparian zones (normally protected from logging) that are 
breeding habitat for an endangered salmon run to test the hypothesis that 
logging does not affect the species, or might even help it.  There is a risk 
that the change to the status quo will harm the species significantly, but 
that risk may result in the production of useful information or reduced 
uncertainty.52  Again, the question is whether the short-term risk of 
increased environmental harm is worth the benefits of long-term 
information production, particularly where the risk is of irreversible 
harm.53 
This tradeoff is particularly challenging because the most 
information might be produced by management options that are the most 
extreme, and, therefore, the most costly or the most risky.54  Small 
manipulations or changes in management strategies are less likely to 
produce significant changes in outcomes that can be detected using 
statistical techniques. 
All of these costs will mean that adaptive management will not 
always (or perhaps often) be a useful management strategy for a wide 
range of environmental problems.  Where reduction in uncertainty is not 
a high priority for managers and regulators—perhaps because 
uncertainty does not matter a lot to decisionmakers,55 or because there 
isn’t a lot of uncertainty to begin with56—then the costs of adaptive 
 
(2010). 
 52.  PIPKIN, supra note 16, at 49-50 (1998) (describing this conflict in the context of 
managing riparian areas of forest in the Pacific Northwest).   
 53.  Where the environmental risks from adaptive management involve irreversible harms to 
resources that society values highly, risks might greatly outweigh any possible benefits from 
adaptive management.  See Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2419 (noting possibility of “taboo 
tradeoffs” that will effectively prevent adaptive management). 
 54.  See Donald Ludwig & Carl J. Walters, Fitting Population Viability Analysis into 
Adaptive Management, in POPULATION VIABILITY ANALYSIS 511, 515 (Steven R. Beissinger & 
Dale R. McCullough eds., 2002). 
 55.  See Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2419 (differences that adaptive management is 
intended to identify must be large enough to matter for decisionmakers); Williams et al., U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 30, at 11 (Adaptive management 
should only be done when the “value of information for decisionmaking is high.”). 
 56.  Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1467-68 
(adaptive management is “only useful if learning is needed” because “information gaps” limit 
management); Rout et al., supra note 42, at 520; Michael A. McCarthy & Hugh P. Possingham, 
Active Adaptive Management for Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 957, 957 (2007). 
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management will rarely be worth it.57 
2. The Costs of Flexibility 
Adaptive management, whether active or passive, necessarily 
requires flexibility in future management or regulatory choices.  That 
flexibility creates uncertainty for human actors—such as developers who 
might wish to know exactly what kinds of mitigation burdens they will 
have to accept as they determine whether a project is economically 
feasible or not.  That uncertainty creates significant costs—economic, 
social, psychological—for the human communities in which adaptive 
management is occurring.58 
There are additional costs from flexibility—the costs that flexibility 
might pose to environmental law in general.  Holly Doremus and others 
have pointed out that the flexibility and discretion adaptive management 
requires may be abused by management and regulatory agencies.  
Indeed, agencies might use the cover of adaptive management, without 
the substance, to pursue other agendas.59 
There is ample literature in environmental legal scholarship that 
points out the asymmetries in implementation of environmental 
regulatory and management standards: In general, because the benefits 
of environmental law are dispersed and the costs concentrated, regulated 
parties will have stronger incentives and abilities to organize, monitor, 
 
 57.  See Michael J. Conroy et al., Application of Decision Theory To Conservation 
Management: Recovery of Hector’s Dolphin, 35 WILDLIFE RESEARCH 93, 99-100 (2008) (should 
only pay for additional information up to “expected value of perfect information” in order to do 
more research that is worthwhile (and usually less, given statistical noise). 
Many advocates for adaptive management argue that society systematically underestimates the 
benefits of learning from adaptive management and overestimates the costs of adaptive 
management.  See, e.g., John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass Darkly: 
Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 
1239, 1256-57 (1993); Walters & Holling, supra note 2, at 2062; Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 7 
(“the costs of lost learning are seldom accounted for when experimentation is restricted or 
prohibited”). 
 58.  See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1406-07, 1413-14 
(2011). 
 59.  See Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource 
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 569 (2007) [hereinafter Doremus, Precaution, Science, and 
Learning]; Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, supra note 11, at 53; 
Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO 
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 80 (2010) [hereinafter Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change]; Daniel 
J. Rohlf, Integrating Science, Law, and Policy in Managing Natural Resources: Towards a Sound 
Mix Rather than a Sound Bite, in FOREST FUTURES 127, 129 (Karen Arabas & Joe Bowersox, eds., 
2004). 
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and influence the passage and implementation of environmental laws.60  
As Dan Farber and others have noted, the result of these public choice 
dynamics can be significant slippage in the implementation of 
environmental laws compared to the standards on the books, and outside 
enforcement of relatively stringent, inflexible standards can be an 
important tool to constrain that slippage.61 
Relatively inflexible standards can also be important pre-
commitment devices.  Richard Lazarus has described how pre-
commitment devices can help address harms that are distributed over 
time and space, as many environment problems are.62  Given the long-
term nature of many environmental harms, such as climate change, pre-
commitment may be important to constrain myopic decision-making by 
implementing agencies or myopic pressure by interest groups.63  Pre-
commitment may be especially important when decision-makers and the 
public might become used to deteriorated environmental conditions and 
therefore sequentially and repeatedly accept more and more 
environmental harm over time (what has been called the “shifting 
baselines” problem);64 inflexible standards can constrain this kind of 
subtle degradation in standards.65 
Flexibility, to the extent that it requires reductions in procedural 
requirements for environmental decision-making, can also impose costs 
in terms of reduced public participation.  Flexibility might directly 
reduce participation by allowing for fewer opportunities for public 
participation.  But even if the proposed changes maintain the same 
opportunities for public participation, and instead only reduce (for 
instance) judicial review of agency compliance with those procedural 
requirements, or judicial review of whether agencies have fully 
 
 60.  See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: 
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 81, 126–31 (2002); Eric Biber, The 
Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 40–49 (2008); 
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in 
Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 307–08 (1999). 
 61.  See Farber, supra note 60, at 298-99; Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and 
Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156 
(2009). 
 62.  Lazarus, supra note 61, at 1197; Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How 
Scientific Disciplines Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 514-21 (2012); 
Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 59, at 48-59.   
 63.  Lazarus, supra note 61, at 1174; Biber, Which Science?, supra note 62, at 516. 
 64.  Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1330 (2009). 
 65.  Of course, this argument presumes the normative undesireability of allowing such shifts 
to occur over time.  For an argument that shifting baselines might be an appropriate response in 
certain circumstances to climate change, see Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 35, 64. 
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considered comments submitted by the public, there may still be 
negative impacts on public participation.  Members of the public may be 
less willing to undertake costly efforts to participate in the decision-
making process if they believe that their contributions are more likely to 
be ignored by the agency.  Judicial review can be seen as a credible 
commitment by the government to ensure that the agency will take 
public participation seriously, and therefore encourage greater 
investments by the public in participation.  Reduced public participation 
will have costs for environmental law and policy.  One risk is that 
reduced public participation may reduce buy-in by various interest 
groups in the ultimate decision, making implementation more difficult.  
It may also reduce the quality of the information available to the agency 
for decision-making.66 
There is one final potential cost to flexibility.  Flexibility can be 
seen as delaying decision-making over time, and indeed, this is precisely 
how adaptive management is supposed to work, as decision-making is 
spread out over time so that additional, useful information can be drawn 
upon.  But decision-making requires resources: the attention, time, and 
consideration of decision-makers (whether administrative, legislative, or 
judicial).  There is no guarantee that when we delay decisions to the 
future that we will have the resources to adequately make decisions then, 
as opposed to now.67 
Moreover, if we increase the number of decisions to be made—
which the flexibility of adaptive management specifically requires—we 
increase the demands on our decisional resources, perhaps beyond their 
limits.  We might have particular concerns about increasing the number 
of decisions when decisions involve value conflicts and high uncertainty, 
and therefore the decisions might be particularly costly.68  Those two 
characteristics are, of course, very true of environmental law.69 
 
 
 66.  For instance, citizen participation appears to improve the decision-making process by 
which species are identified as threatened or endangered and listed for protection under the 
Endangered Species Act.  See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen 
Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
321 (2010); Berry Brosi & Eric Biber, Citizen Involvement in the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 337 
SCI. 802 (2012). 
 67.  Super, supra note 58, at 1406-07, 1435-36. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Increasing the number of decisions, and spreading them out over time, might also 
exacerbate the possibility of slippage, as representatives of diffuse interests may have greater 
difficulty monitoring and influencing decisions that are spread out over time.  See Super, supra note 
58, at 1423. 
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3. Limits to the Ability of Adaptive Management to Improve 
Management, or Problems of Uncertainty 
As noted above, monitoring is essential to evaluating the results of 
adaptive management and to provide the impetus for adaptation in 
response to experiments or even trial and error.  There will almost 
inevitably be uncertainty around monitoring data, because of the 
dynamism of so many environmental resources70 and the limitations that 
the large spatial and temporal scales for many ecological questions pose 
for data collection.71  Indeed, because there can be multiple methods for 
analyzing monitoring data, and there is no consensus on which methods 
are superior in many situations,72 even disputes over how best to analyze 
monitoring data may not be resolvable.  Monitoring and adaptive 
management might not be able to resolve disputes over the state of a 
resource or which management or regulatory options are performing 
best.73 
Powerful political actors that are opposed to major management 
changes can rely on this nearly inevitable, residual uncertainty to argue 
that the results of an adaptive management program do not, in fact, 
require changes in management.74  A helpful example of this 
phenomenon is the history of the adaptive management program for the 
Glen Canyon Dam.  The dam itself has significant impacts on 
downstream natural resources in Grand Canyon National Park.  
 
 70.  Moir & Block, supra note 30, at 144 (“Research seldom has clear answers to contested 
management issues.”); LEE, supra note 46, at 46-48, 57-58; Byron K. Williams & Fred A. Johnson, 
Adaptive Management and the Regulation of Waterfowl Harvests, 23 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULLETIN 
430, 434 (1995); Conroy et al., supra note 57, at 93-94; Bernard T. Bormann & A. Ross Kiester, 
Options Forestry: Acting on Uncertainty, 102 J. OF FORESTRY 22, 22 (June 2004) (“Unknowable 
uncertainties arise when things change faster than they can be measured: Collecting more data does 
not help.”). 
 71.   Ray Hilborn and Donald Ludwig, The Limits of Applied Ecological Research, 3 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 550 (1993); Gregory et al., supra note 25; Doremus, Adaptive 
Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1484-88. 
 72.  Len Thomas, Monitoring Long-Term Population Change: Why Are There So Many 
Analysis Methods?, 77 ECOLOGY 49 (1996).  Figure one in the article highlights how very different 
trend lines can be identified using different analytic tools with the same data. 
 73.  Bormann & Kiester, supra note 70, at 22-23 (“the true confidence intervals surrounding 
many policies overlap, to the extent that choosing one over another is based on something other than 
what is known”); Emery Roe, Why Ecosystem Management Can’t Work Without Social Science: An 
Example from the California Northern Spotted Owl Controversy, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 667, 670-71 
(1996) (adaptive management “will leave behind as many, if not more, research and management 
uncertainties as it resolves”). 
 74.  This is true in the context of a relatively open, public, and democratic political system 
like in the United States.  In a more authoritarian system, the ability of stakeholders to use 
uncertainty to derail adaptive management will be reduced because the role that stakeholders play in 
decisionmaking will be reduced. 
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Controversy over those impacts, along with legal constraints (such as the 
Endangered Species Act) and Congressional action (the Grand Canyon 
Preservation Act (“GCPA”)) forced the Bureau of Reclamation (which 
operates the Dam) to develop an adaptive management program for the 
Dam.  A series of experimental floods beginning in 1996 were designed 
to test whether significant changes to the operations of the Dam might 
improve the conditions of a range of downstream natural resources.  The 
consensus in the scientific and policy literature was that the experimental 
floods were a resounding success, and provided strong and actionable 
monitoring data that supported significant changes in Dam operations.  
Yet it is only recently, about fifteen years after the process began, that 
major changes have occurred in the Dam’s operations.75  Critics argue 
that this is because of the decision-making structure for the Dam: power 
and water interests who would be hurt most by Dam reoperation have an 
effective veto over changes to Dam operation.76  These powerful 
interests have pointed to residual uncertainty about the results of various 
experimental flooding to argue that there is no basis for significant 
changes in Dam operations.77  They also have drawn on burden of proof.  
In an early article on adaptive management for the Dam, staff members 
for the Western Area Power Administration (one of the major power 
interests associated with the Dam) called for setting a high burden of 
proof for any changes from the status quo for Dam operations.78 
Political pressure in this context may well be asymmetric; it might 
regularly weigh more on the side of increasing exploitation of natural 
resources for human use in the face of uncertain data about the status of 
those resources.  In the fisheries context, there is evidence that when 
fisheries scientists give policymakers a range of possible figures for the 
status of a fishery (highlighting the uncertainty present in the data),79 
 
 75.   See Felicity Barringer, Dam’s Flow Limit Loosened to Feed Grand Canyon, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/science/earth/dam-limits-loosened-
to-feed-grand-canyon.html (reporting proposal by government to allow for high-flow releases from 
Glen Canyon Dam, a significant change from prior dam management). 
 76.  Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of 
Social Engineering Over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 897, 921-29 (2008); Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond 
Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 
NEV. L.J. 942, 947-53 (2008); Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive 
Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2010). 
 77.  Susskind et al., supra note 76, at 46-49; Feller, supra note 76, at 921-29. 
 78.  Mark J. Wieringa and Anthony G. Morton, Hydropower, Adaptive Management, and 
Biodiversity, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 831, 832-33 (1996) (“Operational modifications should have 
measurable and beneficial effects that clearly outweigh the adverse effects on other resources.”). 
 79.  Many leading adaptive management scholars regularly call for agencies and scientists to 
“embrace uncertainty” by being open about uncertainty in their communications with the public and 
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policymakers consistently choose the estimates that will allow the most 
fishing activity, and therefore increase the risk of collapse for a fishery.80  
Indeed, fisheries scientists have argued that this is precisely what 
happened in the run-up to the collapse of the Canada Atlantic cod 
fishery—a fishery that once was one of the largest in the world and has 
been defunct since the mid-1990s.  According to these assessments, both 
scientists and policymakers consistently drew the most optimistic 
conclusions about the status of the cod fishery from the relevant data, 
until the collapse was so obvious that there was no choice but to 
completely end fishing.81 
Even where there is not disproportionate political power among the 
various interest groups involved in an environmental dispute, uncertainty 
may nonetheless allow various stakeholders to continue fights over 
policy even after the adaptive management program has been 
established. Most natural resource debates involve fundamental conflicts 
over goals and objectives.82  As such they are examples of “wicked 
 
in the development of management and regulatory decisions.  See generally Walters, supra note 42; 
Williams et al., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 30, at 3-4; 
Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 29; LEE, supra note 46, at 63; Gunderson, Adaptive Dancing, supra 
note 42, at 37-38; Ray Hilborn et al., Current Trends in Including Risk and Uncertainty in Stock 
Assessment and Harvest Decisions, 50 CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 874 (1993) (call for 
fisheries biologists to be more explicit about risk and uncertainty when presenting stock assessments 
to decision-makers). 
 80.  See Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry’s Question: 
Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649 (2003). 
 81.  See Jeffrey A. Hutchings & Ransom A. Myers, What Can Be Learned from the Collapse 
of a Renewable Resource? Atlantic Cod, Gadus morhua, of Newfoundland and Labrador, 51 
CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 2126, 2144 (1994); Jeffrey A. Hutchings et al., Is 
Scientific Inquiry Incompatible With Government Information Control?, 54 CANADIAN J. FISHERIES 
& AQUATIC SCI. 1198, 1198-99, 1202-03 (1997); Lennox O’Reilly Hinds, Crisis in Canada’s 
Atlantic Sea Fisheries, 19 MARINE POL’Y 271, 281 (1995); Quinn Schiermeier, How Many More 
Fish in the Sea?, 419 NATURE 662, 662-63 (2002); Ransom A. Myers et al., Hypotheses for the 
Decline of Cod in the North Atlantic, 138 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 293 (1996); The 
Cod that Disappeared, NEW SCIENTIST, 16 Sept. 1995, at 24, 28; D.H. Steele et al., The Managed 
Commercial Annihilation of Northern Cod, 8 NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES 34, 48 (1992); Barbara 
Neis, Fishers’ Ecological Knowledge and Stock Assessment in Newfoundland, 8 NEWFOUNDLAND 
STUDIES 155, 171-72 (1992); Cabot Martin, The Collapse of the Northern Cod Stocks: Whatever 
Happened to 86/25?, 20 FISHERIES No. 5, p. 6, 7 (May 1995). 
 82.  R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on “What is Ecosystem Management?”, 11 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41, 47 (1997) (“All resource allocation decisions are matters of political 
struggle rather than technical facts.”); Rebecca J. McLain & Robert G. Lee, Adaptive Management: 
Promises and Pitfalls, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 437, 439 (1996); Conroy et al., supra note 57, at 93 
(“decisions in conservation biology commonly involve conflicts over objectives”); LEE, supra note 
46, at 87; R. McGreggor Cawley & John Freemuth, Tree Farms, Mother Earth, and Other 
Dilemmas: The Politics of Ecosystem Management in Greater Yellowstone, 6 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 
41 (1993); W. Bruce Shepard, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: New Perspectives’ in the Forest 
Service, RENEWABLE RES. J. 8 (1990). 
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problems” for which “there are no true or false answers.”  In these 
problems “many parties are equally equipped, interested, and/or entitled 
to judge the solutions, although none has the power to set formal 
decision rules to determine correctness.  Their judgments are likely to 
differ widely to accord with their group or personal interests, their 
special value-sets, and their ideological predilections.”83 
In the environmental context there are a wide range of goals that 
stakeholders pursue, and many of those goals are seen as permissible 
politically and legally.84  For instance, adaptive management is often 
pursued as part of the broader concept of ecosystem management.  But 
goals in ecosystem management tend to be vague.85  They are frequently 
too broad to be of use to structure outcomes or constrain the level of 
debate among stakeholders about what goals should be.86 
Yet there is a widespread agreement in the adaptive management 
literature that, at least in the beginning of the adaptive management 
process, there needs to be a clear articulation among 
participants/managers/stakeholders as to the objectives or the goals for 
the regulatory or management program in question.87  Clear goals are 
 
 83.  Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 
POL’Y SCI. 155, 163 (1973); Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing 
for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L. J. 407, 433-34 (2008).  
 84.  See AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY 
ANALYSIS 215 (1979) (“To know whether objectives are being achieved, one must first know what 
they are supposed to be.  Yet, the assumption that objectives are known, clear, and consistent is at 
variance with all experience.  We know that objectives invariably may be distinguished by three 
outstanding qualities: they are multiple, conflicting, and vague. . . .  The classic case is the multiple-
use concept in natural resources that posits equal value for both preservation and use.’”). 
 85.  See, e.g., Thomas A. More, Forestry’s Fuzzy Concepts: An Examination of Ecosystem 
Management, 94 J. OF FORESTRY 8, 19 (Aug. 1996); Allan K. Fitzsimmons, Sound Policy or Smoke 
and Mirrors: Does Ecosystem Management Make Sense?, 32 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 217 
(1996); Oliver Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
869, 938 (1997); Steven L. Yaffee, Three Faces of Ecosystem Management, 13 CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 713 (1999). 
 86.  Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in 
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1261 (2008); Roger A Sedjo, 
Toward an Operational Approach to Public Forest Management, 94 J. OF FORESTRY 8, 24 (Aug. 
1996) (noting vagueness of the concept and that it is “least intelligible when determining 
objectives”). 
 87.  Byron K. Williams, Adaptive Management of Natural Resources — Framework and 
Issues, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1346, 1348 (2011); Jamie E. McFadden et al., Evalauting the Efficacy 
of Adaptive Management Approaches: Is There a Formula For Success?, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 
1354, 1356 (2011); Byron K. Williams, Passive and Active Adaptive Management: Approaches and 
an Example, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1371, 1178 (2011); Clinton T. Moore et al., Adaptive 
Management in the U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System: Science-Management Partnerships for 
Conservation Delivery, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1395 1396 (2011); Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 
2418; James E. Lyons et al., Monitoring in the Context of Structured Decision-Making and Adaptive 
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important for an adaptive management program for three reasons.  First, 
goals help determine what the important management or regulatory 
questions are, and therefore what information an adaptive management 
program can provide and how to design monitoring or experiments to 
reduce the relevant uncertainty.88  Second, goals help determine what 
kinds of tradeoffs are present in making decisions about whether and 
how to pursue adaptive management (i.e., what costs will be necessarily 
entailed by an adaptive management program, and whether those costs 
are worth paying).89  Finally, goals are required so that the adaptive 
management program can evaluate success or failure for various 
management options.90 
Given all this, it is no surprise that a failure to resolve underlying 
controversy has been identified as a reason why adaptive management 
has failed.  Stakeholders that are still in conflict over underlying goals 
for a regulatory or management program may continually point to 
residual uncertainty to support their differing positions and resist 
unfavorable regulatory or management action, even in the face of 
apparently successful experiments and monitoring programs.91  The 
Glen Canyon Dam adaptive management program again provides an 
example of this dynamic: Congress has never provided clear guidance 
among conflicting goals for management of the Dam (water storage, 
power generation, recreational use, protection of downstream Grand 
Canyon resources, and protection of endangered species), and due to 
this, it is difficult to resolve underlying uncertainty by determining what 
 
Management, 77 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1683, 1684 (2008); Craig R. Allen et al., supra note 12, at 
1339; N. SALUFSKY ET AL., BIODIVERSITY SUPPORT PROGRAM, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: A TOOL 
FOR CONSERVATION PURPOSES 34-36 (2001); Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 47 fig. 7.   
 88.  Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1469 
(noting “the need for clear goals” for adaptive management to succeed, because “[w]ithout 
identified management goals, it is impossible to understand what relevant information is missing”).  
 89.  For instance, an adaptive harvest management for North American waterfowl was limited 
in terms of management choices and experimentation because of fundamental disagreements about 
what goals of management should be, and how to prioritize among those goals (harvest size, 
population size, simplicity of regulatory system, among others in developing and implementing 
experiments).  Fred A. Johnson, Learning and Adaptation in the Management of Waterfowl 
Harvests, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1385, 1391-92 (2011). 
 90.  Gordon L. Baskerville, The Forestry Problem: Adaptive Lurches of Renewal, in 
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWABLE OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 37, 88 (Lance H. 
Gunderson et al., eds. 1995). 
 91.  McLain & Lee, supra note 82, at 261, 279; Courtland L. Smith et al. Sailing the Shoals of 
Adaptive Management: The Case of Salmon in the Pacific Northwest, 22 ENVTL. MGMT. 671 (1998) 
(noting how significant uncertainty in scientific understanding of why salmon runs are decreasing is 
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risks are more important and what risks are less important to consider in 
making management changes.92  As a result, all stakeholders can point to 
the uncertainty that surrounds the management or regulatory choices 
they oppose, and effectively stalemate any changes in management or 
regulation in an ongoing proxy fight over the goals.93 
Thus, disputes over values or conflicts may not be resolved by an 
adaptive management process, but instead simply exist below the 
surface, manifesting themselves in ongoing contests over whether the 
adaptive management program has really “proven” anything.  In contrast 
to disputes where there is a shared understanding of common goals, 
adaptive management is constrained in its ability to solve disputes with 
underlying value conflicts.94 
III. CONCLUSION 
My focus here has been on the question of whether adaptive 
management should be the justification for major changes in the 
structure and process of environmental law, and my conclusion is a 
skeptical one.  There may well be other reasons that we want to increase 
flexibility and dynamism in environmental law, perhaps because of 
changes in climate,95 but those should be based on other arguments in 
addition to, or instead of, adaptive management. 
Nonetheless, while adaptive management is not a panacea, I also 
believe that it will play a useful, even important, role in environmental 
decision-making, within significant limits.  Those limits include: 
 
 
 92.  Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 13, at 930-31; see also HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., 
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 46, at 4 (arguing that lack of clear goals doomed 
the adaptive management program in the Everglades).   
 93.  Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2418 (“A skilled participant can nearly always spin 
issues of uncertainty management in creative and self-serving ways.”); see also Robert H. Socolow, 
Failures of Discourse: Obstacles to the Integration of Environmental Values Into Natural Resource 
Policy, in WHEN VALUES CONFLICT: ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, DISCOURSE, AND 
DECISION 1-2 (Laurence H. Tribe et al., eds. 1976); Andrew J. Tyre & Sarah Michaels, Confronting 
Socially Generated Uncertainty in Adaptive Management, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1365, 1366-67 
(2011) (describing how, when subjective expert probabilities are used to parameterize biological 
models, stakeholders will contest those probabilities that conflict with their goals). 
 94.  Fred Johnson & Ken Williams, Protocol and Practice in the Adaptive Management of 
Waterfowl Harvests, 3 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y ART. 8 (1999), available at 
http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss1/art8; FLEISCHMAN, supra note 12, at 16; Koontz & Bodine, 
supra note 12, at 65 (BLM employees report that unresolved conflict is a major reason why 
ecosystem management fails); Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 34 (framing problems “as technical 
in nature when often they involve value-based issues” has lead to problems with many adaptive 
management projects). 
 95.  Kundis Craig, supra note 10. 
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• A geographic and temporal scale that makes either multiple 
management and regulatory options, or at least monitoring 
of ongoing management and regulatory decisions, 
feasible;96 
• Time that is sufficient for adaptive management to provide 
useful information before decisions expected to have 
system-transforming results need to be made; 
• Institutional and legal structures that will ensure the 
production of high-quality monitoring data and that are 
stable enough to maintain monitoring and adaptive 
management programs over extended periods of time; 
• Benefits of adaptive management (in terms of improved 
information and reduced uncertainty) that exceed the costs 
(not just the direct costs of setting up management options 
and monitoring the results, but also the indirect costs of 
foregone benefits from exploitation of the resource and 
increased short-term risks of harm to valuable resources); 
• Flexibility that does not present unacceptable levels of 
uncertainty for society or undermine management or 
regulation because of political pressures;97 
• Sufficient agreement on underlying management and 
regulatory goals that makes it plausible that additional 
information will improve the decision-making process; 
• Dynamism and uncertainty that are high enough to justify 
the need for adaptive management, but not so high that they 
make it difficult or impossible to reduce uncertainty 
through adaptive management. 
These limits apply to both active and passive adaptive management, 
though they may more seriously limit active adaptive management. 
It is unclear whether many of these criteria are actually satisfied in 
many of the areas of environmental law where adaptive management is 
currently being pursued.  For instance, adaptive management might not 
be appropriate for fisheries where the relevant species population 
dynamics are so complex and unpredictable that additional data may not 
be useful for management.98  Adaptive management faces serious 
 
 96.  See generally Gregory et al., supra note 25.   
 97.  For an effort to develop a proposal that achieves this, see Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 
17, arguing for principled flexibility in which flexibility is allowed with respect to the means of 
achieving environmental goals, but not as to which goals are pursued or whether action should be 
taken to achieve those goals.  See also Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 59.  
 98.  See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
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challenges when used for the protection of endangered species, both 
because there may not be sufficient time to develop additional 
information before major, irreversible, high-stakes decisions have to be 
made, and because the risks of short-term irreversible harm for 
endangered species from experimentation might outweigh the benefits of 
improved information.99  As for climate change adaptation, for changes 
that are happening at a large temporal and geographic scale, pursuing 
active adaptive management might be infeasible and too costly.100 
Of course, any assessment of the merits and demerits of adaptive 
management as a policy tool has to be relative: how effective is adaptive 
management compared to other possible options?  The current primary 
option is what J.B. Ruhl has called “front-end” decision-making,101 in 
which decision-makers attempt to fully predict possible outcomes based 
on different alternatives, weigh the pros and cons of those different 
alternatives, and implement the best alternative, without significant 
follow-up monitoring or adjustment in response to that monitoring.102  
On some of the issues discussed in this paper, both adaptive 
management and “front-end” analysis have their pros and cons: front-
end analysis will be more useful where dynamism and complexity are 
limited and adaptive management where dynamism and complexity are 
more significant, but still allow for learning.  But where dynamism and 
complexity might be so high that learning is impossible, we might again 
be better off with relatively rigid, inflexible standards based on front-end 
analysis.103 
For other factors, “front-end” analysis at first blush appears 
superior.  Rigid, up-front standards avoid the risks and costs of 
flexibility described in this paper.  For still others, adaptive management 
might be the best of a bad set of choices.  For instance, it seems clear 
that adaptive management will, in general, be better in producing 
information in the face of uncertainty than “front-end” analysis, even 
where scale imposes significant limits on adaptive management.104  The 
 
 99.  But see Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously, supra note 19, at 1265 (“the one 
spot on the spectrum of species decline we ought to hope and expect to find adaptive management at 
work is at the point when we think a species might very well become extinct.  If we do not practice 
adaptive management at that stage, what is the point of doing anything?”). 
 100.  Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2423. 
 101.  Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 8. 
 102.  This model describes how environmental analysis under NEPA more or less currently 
proceeds.  See e.g., Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002). 
 103.  See, e.g., Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560 
(1983). 
 104.  See supra Section II.A.1. 
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flexibility of adaptive management, if implemented right, might also 
make decision-making more responsive to rapid (but not-too-rapid) 
changes in environmental conditions. 
A full examination of the relative pros and cons of adaptive 
management and the other, main alternatives is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  I think one of the most important lessons of this paper is that 
such a relative analysis is necessary, and not just on the turf that is most 
favorable to adaptive management. 
There are two other major lessons that I draw from the limits of 
adaptive management.  First, instead of attempting to adopt wholesale 
the concept of adaptive management into environmental law and 
concomitantly force major changes on environmental law to make the fit 
work,105 we might instead look to see how the concept of adaptive 
management might be “adapted” so it works better with environmental 
law.  While scholars have criticized agencies for pursuing passive 
adaptive management or trial and error, rather than active adaptive 
management, and have argued for legal and structural changes in 
response, my assessment indicates that perhaps we should be more 
sympathetic to the agencies and the law.  There might be good reasons 
that large-scale experiments are not feasible for many of the regulatory 
and management problems we face.  It is for these reasons Holly 
Doremus has suggested the phrase “learning while doing” instead of 
adaptive management because the former phrase broadens the focus 
beyond large-scale experiments.106  I think this is an important first step 
in making the discussions over the interaction between adaptive 
management and environmental law into a two-way conversation 
between legal scholars and environmental managers and scientists about 
how both adaptive management and environmental law might need to be 
adjusted to work better together. 
Second, we might question whether the adaptation that adaptive 
management requires in environmental law means that the legal system 
must necessarily become more flexible.  Indeed, it may be that 
stringently applied standards in environmental law could help us better 
achieve the underlying goals of learning while doing or adaptive 
management.  Tough standards can both inspire the efforts needed to 
establish adaptive management programs that might increase 
information—for example, ESA restrictions threaten significant 
 
 105.  See, e.g., Karkkainen, Panarchy, supra note 15, at 77. 
 106.  See Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning, supra note 59, at 568-70. 
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economic impacts unless a better management solution is found107— and 
also provide outer limits on the experiments and changes that are part of 
adaptive management, providing important protection to valuable 
resources.108 
An example of how standards might be usefully applied to adaptive 
management is the concept of triggers: ex ante standards that, if met, 
automatically cause significant management or regulatory responses.109  
Triggers can be used to force adaptation in response to monitoring 
results; they can also be used to provide underlying guarantees that 
important resources will be protected from serious, irreversible impacts 
from adaptive management experiments.110 
Triggers have limits: triggers cannot produce agreements where 
none are to be found.111  Sophisticated stakeholders who understand 
uncertainty and the relevant resources that are relevant for the dispute 
 
 107.  See, e.g., FLEISCHMAN, supra note 12, at 16; Joy B. Zedler, Adaptive Management of 
Coastal Ecosystems to Support Endangered Species, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 735 (1997); Yaffee, supra 
note 13, at 726 (arguing that ESA is “needed to encourage development interests and agencies to 
engage in the multiparty discussions critical to achieving effective eco- system management”); 
Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 57, at 1263-64 (arguing ESA helped force environmental 
protection and change the political burden of proof for ecological restoration). 
 108.   See, e.g., Rohlf, Integrating Science, Law, and Policy in Managing Natural Resources, 
supra note 59; Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously, supra note 19, at 1249 (noting need 
for “inflexible commands” as part of overall process); Carl Walters, Designing Fisheries 
Management Systems That Do Not Depend Upon Accurate Stock Assessment, 280, in REINVENTING 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Tony J. Pitcher et al., eds. 1998) (in light of fundamental uncertainty in 
fisheries, calling for using a coarse, fixed standard in which we “treat the seas as closed to fishing 
with small exceptions”); Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, 
at 1485; Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 8, at 54-56 (arguing that 
implementation of adaptive management requires restrictions on volatility and drift in agency 
decision-making). 
 109.  Moir & Block, supra note 30, at 146; HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 46, at 11 (“In order to ensure that adaptation occurs, 
management plans should set forth clear benchmarks for adapting to new information or changing 
circumstances.”); SALUFSKY ET AL., supra note 87, at 59-60; Doremus, Adaptive Management, the 
Endangered Species Act, supra note 11, at 85-86; Julien Martin, et al., Structured Decision Making 
As A Conceptual Framework To Identify Thresholds For Conservation And Management, 19 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1079, 1080-81 (2009).  For a thorough overview of triggers and how 
they have been used, see Martin Nie & Courtney Schultz, Decision Making Triggers in Adaptive 
Management, REPORT TO USDA PACIFIC NORTHWEST RESEARCH STATION, NEPA FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (Nov. 1, 2011). 
 110.  Another advantage is that by requiring stakeholders or agency staff to articulate what 
levels of uncertainty are acceptable for a monitoring program, triggers can produce a constructive 
dialogue about uncertainty and the role it might play in decision-making—much the way that initial 
modeling in adaptive management programs can produce a constructive dialogue about underlying 
assumptions and goals in environmental disputes. 
 111.  See Nie & Schultz, Decision Making Triggers in Adaptive Management, supra note 109 
(noting how triggers have not resolved disputes over the management of the Tongass National 
Forest). 
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will know how to manipulate the setting of triggers and won’t agree to 
triggers that might undermine their goals.112  If ex ante uncertainty is 
high enough to preclude this kind of strategy, sophisticated stakeholders 
may simply refuse to agree to triggers.  Moreover, it is impossible to 
predict and plan for all contingencies in environmental regulation and 
management.  Thus, there is an inevitable possibility that surprises will 
be turned up in the adaptive management program that haven’t been 
planned for in the trigger system.113  Finally, there is a risk that the 
trigger system might have an “expiration date.”  If the monitoring 
program and trigger system require a long enough time to operate, the 
political, economic, and social landscape may have changed 
significantly in the interim, such that any trigger might not be 
enforceable.114 
There are other possibilities.  For instance, statutes that authorize or 
even require agencies to use adaptive management do not necessarily 
need to give the agencies more flexibility.  Simply granting the authority 
or even mandating adaptive management might be done without making 
other changes to the various procedural or substantive structures in 
environmental law.115 
Even changes to existing procedural or substantive requirements to 
help advance adaptive management need not result in overall reductions 
in flexibility.  Indeed, if properly structured, such changes might reduce 
the risk that agencies attempt to use adaptive management to augment 
their discretion at the expense of other important goals.  Statutory 
reforms might require that an agency make certain findings before 
pursuing adaptive management (e.g., that adaptive management will in 
fact be useful for the problems the agency is attempting to address), and 
 
 112.  WILDAVSKY, supra note 84, at 216 (“Strategically located participants often refuse to 
accept definitions of objectives that would put them at a disadvantage or in a straightjacket should 
they wish to change their designation of what they do in the future.”).  There are a range of ways in 
which triggers can be adjusted or manipulated: the baseline from which the triggers is measured, the 
actual level for the trigger, or the level of uncertainty required to be satisfied for determining 
whether that level has been met; and the mandatory nature of the specific management or regulatory 
responses that will be imposed if the trigger is met.  All of these points are often the focus of 
significant dispute among stakeholders.  See Nie & Schultz, Decision Making Triggers in Adaptive 
Management, supra note 109. 
 113.   Such situations may nonetheless be useful, as they produce very important information 
about the world, helpfully revising our scientific understandings. LEE, supra note 46, at 148-49.  
 114.  See SALUFSKY ET AL., supra note 87, at 60 (unclear “whether people would make 
decisions based on a discussion that had been held years ago”). 
 115.  Of course, if adaptive management really does require substantial changes in procedural 
or substantive requirements in environmental law, authorizing or requiring its use by agencies 
without making those changes simply sets those agencies up for failure. 
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it might impose significant requirements on an agency that seeks to 
pursue adaptive management (e.g., mandatory, enforceable monitoring 
or reporting requirements), in return for some revisions to existing 
procedural or substantive requirements.  The goal here would be to make 
adaptive management useful for an agency when adaptive management 
is, in fact, a useful tool for reducing uncertainty, rather than a 
standardless loophole from otherwise applicable legal requirements.  
The result of such a balance might be fewer claims by agencies that they 
are using adaptive management (because such claims now come with 
real, but useful, costs), but more real use of adaptive management.  What 
adaptive management might need, ultimately, is not more flexibility than 
traditional environmental law, but different kinds of constraints. 
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